Analysts pointed to the political context of the hijab restrictions in Azerbaijan.

Restrictions on wearing hijabs in schools in Azerbaijan may increase tensions between the state and the religious part of society. The actions of the authorities may be related to political concerns—specifically, the desire to prevent the use of religious discontent by external forces. At the same time, the religious environment in Azerbaijan is heterogeneous, and support for protests from public and political organizations remains limited, analysts noted.

As reported by "Caucasian Knot", in Azerbaijan, after the tightening of requirements for school uniforms, female students wearing hijabs were no longer allowed to attend classes, which sparked protests from parents, students, and believers. On October 12, students and teachers held lessons in the streets near several schools in Baku in protest against the restrictions. On October 13, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan reported the detention of 37 protest participants, while activists claimed that more than 200 were detained. The protests were also accompanied by arson of cars, and two residents of the country were administratively arrested for criticizing the restrictions.

The ban on hijabs has a political dimension

Approaching the introduction of restrictions on wearing hijabs in Azerbaijani schools and the perception of this measure by society should not only be seen as a dispute between supporters of secular education and believers: this issue also has a political dimension, said the head of the Caspian Research and Analysis Center, political scientist Elman Fatthakh, in an interview with the correspondent of "Caucasian Knot".

In the public discussion, two main interpretations of what is happening can be distinguished, the analyst noted.

According to the first, the state is protecting the secular nature of education, preventing the spread of religious radicalism, and striving to maintain the neutral character of schools. The second interpretation is that the ruling regime, consistently suppressing secular opposition, independent media, and non-governmental organizations, has created conditions in which it now has to confront religious discontent.

"The second version seems convincing at first glance. It suggests that the secular opposition could have played a role as a kind of political buffer, and its elimination deprived the authorities of alternative channels for public representation. However, I believe that explaining what is happening as a simple political mistake does not reveal the full logic of the situation. The weakening of the secular opposition is not a strategic loss for the authorities in defending against 'religious radicalism.' On the contrary, the elimination of political competitors allows the state to determine which public forces will be represented in the public space, which topics will be the subject of discussion, and in what frameworks it is permissible to express discontent. On the other hand, the religious environment in Azerbaijan is heterogeneous. Shia and Sunni communities, various conservative and Salafi movements differ in religious views, social attitudes, and their relationship with the state. The presence of common grievances against certain decisions of the authorities does not in itself mean that these groups are capable of uniting into a single political movement, and the authorities can play on the contradictions between them," Fatthakh noted.

The thesis that "the authorities are left alone with religious forces" is beneficial to the authorities themselves. It helps them create the impression of the existence of a single and potentially dangerous opponent where, in fact, there are different communities, beliefs, and forms of public discontent.

Therefore, he believes, presenting the situation around the hijab restrictions as a confrontation between two monolithic forces—the state and the believers—overly simplifies reality.

"Believers do not constitute a single political organization. And the thesis that 'the authorities are left alone with religious forces' is beneficial to the authorities themselves. It helps them create the impression of the existence of a single and potentially dangerous opponent where, in fact, there are different communities, beliefs, and forms of public discontent," Fatthakh continued.

He is convinced that the tension around the hijab is a problem artificially created by the authorities.

"The ban on hijabs would inevitably provoke protests. But in conditions where democratic institutions are paralyzed, there are virtually no free media, and a strong repressive apparatus is in place, it is not difficult for the authorities to create 'managed crises.' At the same time, provoking protests among believers heightens the fears of supporters of a secular state. They say: 'There is no democracy, but at least this government is capable of restraining religious radicals.' These groups of the population support the introduction of restrictions on believers. The latter, in turn, rally against those who support the hijab bans, and society splits into two conditional large camps. Meanwhile, the authorities gain dividends from such confrontation on the international stage, shaping in political circles in Washington and Brussels the idea that the alternative to the Azerbaijani regime could be forces similar to the Iranian theocracy or the model of Erdogan's Turkey, where religious institutions play an increasingly prominent role in the state and public life," Fatthakh said.

To support his words about the artificial escalation of the conflict around the hijab, he pointed to the small, in his estimation, number of students and teachers wearing such clothing.

Among a million schoolchildren, including about half a million girls, no more than 20,000 attend school in hijabs.

According to him, in urban schools in Baku, the proportion of female students attending classes in hijabs is no more than 3-5%.

"In Baku's settlements and some rural areas, where religious traditions are traditionally strong, the number of female students in hijabs may be higher. But overall, I think, among a million schoolchildren, including about half a million girls, no more than 20,000 attend school in hijabs. Approximately the same proportion of female teachers in hijabs may be among the total number of educators. There has been no significant growth in the number of those attending schools in hijabs in recent years. Given this situation, it hardly seems worth creating such tension for the sake of asserting 'secularity' in education," Fatthakh said.

Lawyer and political analyst Samad Ragimli believes that the introduction of restrictions on wearing hijabs at the government level may be related to two factors.

"The first is geopolitical tension in the region, the exacerbation of the political situation around Azerbaijan, which has found itself at the center of contradictions in the triangle of Iran—Israel—Turkey. Perhaps the authorities believed that the use of believers by external forces could threaten stability, and decided to identify potential centers of protests and resistance through hijab bans in order to preemptively neutralize them. The second factor may be related to the political system of Azerbaijan, based on authoritarian pragmatism. Such regimes do not have their own stable ideological base and therefore see a threat in other ideologies. It is obvious that in Azerbaijan, where about 98% of the population are Muslims, Islam remains a popular ideology," he noted.

In recent years, official propaganda has sought to form an alternative identity among the population—national, Ragimli emphasized.

"It is characteristic that in recent days, narratives have been promoted in the media and social networks that the hijab is an element alien to Azerbaijani clothing, while Azerbaijanis have their own type of headwear—the kyalaqi (a patterned scarf that can be thrown over the head without fully covering it - note from 'Caucasian Knot'). As the socio-economic situation in the country worsens and the incomes of the population decline, the authorities are interested in consolidating society around their own ideological narratives," Ragimli said.

According to his observations, the number of believers in Azerbaijan is gradually increasing.

"I do not have exact statistics, but from personal observations, the number of believers in Azerbaijan is gradually increasing. Naturally, with the growth in the number of believers, the number of Islamists may also increase. The authorities are monitoring these processes and are striving to preemptively curb potential problems they may face in the near or foreseeable future," the analyst noted.

When asked whether the protests in defense of the right to wear hijabs found support among public and political groups, Ragimli replied that many citizens and political activists expressed solidarity with believers on social networks.

However, he said, there is virtually no support at the level of public organizations and political parties, as there are currently virtually no conditions for full-fledged public and political activity in Azerbaijan. Moreover, many are deterred by fears that supporting believers may lead to accusations of 'aiding Iran.'

The analyst doubted the impact of repression on religious beliefs

Researcher Javid Agha believes that it is impossible to change people's religious beliefs through repressive measures.

"Azerbaijan has already gone through this. In 2010, the authorities effectively tested this mechanism—the hijab ban—through then-Minister of Education Misir Mardanov. In December of the same year, protests began outside the ministry building, and in 2012, new clashes and a wave of arrests followed, resulting in a group of political prisoners known as 'hijab prisoners.' This policy did not lead families to abandon their religious beliefs but created favorable conditions for Iranian religious figures to position themselves as defenders of Azerbaijani schoolgirls," Agha said to the correspondent of "Caucasian Knot," being a member of the Baku Institute for Research operating in exile.

Bans on religious clothing do not change people's beliefs, the researcher believes. On the contrary, they can increase alienation between society and the state and influence whom citizens begin to perceive as their opponent.

"There is no reason to believe that in 2026 such a policy will lead to fundamentally different results. If the authorities seek to limit the influence of religious circles, such measures may have the opposite effect—strengthening their positions and expanding opportunities for mobilizing the discontented," Agha noted.

In his opinion, in conditions where pro-government media generally form a negative attitude towards hijabs, school restrictions may be perceived not as an educational policy measure but as part of a broader campaign against the religious environment.

"This creates additional opportunities for external players, including Iranian religious circles, to present themselves as defenders of believers and use discontent for their own interests. There are different models of secular education. Even in many Western countries, hijabs for Muslim women are allowed in schools. In this case, the Azerbaijani government should explain how its approach differs from the Soviet practice of administrative regulation of religious life," Agha said.

There is mass support and demonstration of solidarity from individual citizens on social networks. Some girls who previously did not wear hijabs are demonstratively covering their heads and sharing photos. However, there is virtually no active support from public and political organizations.

Support for protests against the hijab ban is limited

Public and political organizations in Azerbaijan have not shown active support for the protests of believers, noted one of the activists who spoke with the correspondent of "Caucasian Knot" on condition of anonymity.

"There is mass support and demonstration of solidarity from individual citizens on social networks. Some girls who previously did not wear hijabs are demonstratively covering their heads and sharing photos. However, there is virtually no active support from public and political organizations. The online resource of the Popular Front—the page of the newspaper 'Azadlyg' on Facebook*—actively shares videos of the believers' protests. The Musavat Party issued a statement calling on the authorities not to restrict the opportunities of schoolgirls in hijabs to receive education, and for teachers to teach in such clothing. The leader of the White Party, Tural Abbasly, also actively condemns the hijab bans on social networks. Otherwise, the authorities are mainly sharply criticized by bloggers and activists in exile," said the interlocutor of "Caucasian Knot."

Author: Faik Mejid, source, correspondent of "Caucasian Knot"