Analysts assessed the impact of scandals before the election campaign in southern Russia on the political landscape.

The settlement with the senator from Karachay-Cherkessia, Salpagarov, may allow him to retain his position in the Federation Council, but the prospects for State Duma deputy from Dagestan, Umakhanov, are questionable against the backdrop of the persecution of his brother. The absence of several regional leaders at the head of the "United Russia" lists from regions and republics in the parliamentary elections, according to analysts, indicates a desire to distance themselves from the ruling party, although in the case of Kadyrov, it may be a decision from the Kremlin.

As reported by "Caucasian Knot", according to the decision of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the elections to the State Duma in 2026 will take place over three days - from September 18 to 20. According to the head of the CEC, Ella Pamfilova, the multi-day voting format is not only convenient for voters but also an essential element of security. Putin signed a decree on appointing a single voting day on September 20.

Member of the Adam Smith Center Council, political scientist Sergey Boyko, political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin*, electoral analyst David Kankiya*, journalist Milrad Fatulaev, Rostov political scientist Dmitry Abrosimov commented to "Caucasian Knot" on a number of high-profile scandals that occurred in southern Russia shortly before the election campaign.

The Salpagarov case has become a signal to the elites of the North Caucasus

Sergey Boyko stated that the settlement on the lawsuit of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation against senator Salpagarov and those affiliated with him represents a working practice for the nationalization of part of the assets appropriated by regional clans.

"This mechanism allows the state to effectively reclaim assets that have interested federal authorities for its benefit, and then redistribute them in favor of more influential power actors. The conclusion of the settlement indicates that the influential clan of the Temrezovs-Salpagarovs managed to convince federal authorities of their loyalty and readiness to support stability in the region while sacrificing part of their assets," he told the correspondent of "Caucasian Knot."

This is an important signal to the elites of the North Caucasus that they need to share what they previously seized

However, according to the political scientist, the story is not over yet, as the Prosecutor General's Office can resume the process against the Temrezov-Salpagarov clan at any moment.

"This is an important signal to the elites of the North Caucasus that they need to share what they previously seized," Boyko pointed out.

Dmitry Oreshkin* believes that the withdrawal of claims, the closure of a criminal or any other legal case by agreement of the parties is a fairly common practice if it were a dispute between private individuals.

"This practice is more widespread in the West, where there is a more diverse system of legal control over conflicts. But in the Russian Federation, usually, if one of the conflicting parties represents a state structure, it does not go for this. Nevertheless, in the post-Soviet, including the Caucasian context, it often happens that someone simply paid a ransom, and the state decided to back off because the state is represented by specific people," he said, noting that he is not familiar with the reasons for such a decision in the Salpagarov case.

The situation with senator Salpagarov, on the contrary, demonstrates the flexibility of the authorities in reaching agreements, believes Milrad Fatulaev.

"Here, the legal nuance (for example, that a settlement between the senator and the state is fundamentally impossible or that the court's wording about 'not contradicting the law and not violating the rights of the parties' looks vague) is not as important as the trend itself. 'Working with assets' has become a noticeable state course: recently, the results of dozens of privatizations have been reviewed, confiscations of property in gigantic volumes have been practiced, up to the complete loss of assets. The Prosecutor's Office and courts willingly go down this path. Besides the obvious redistribution of property and competition with rivals, there is also a visible budget deficit in recent years," Fatulaev explained to the correspondent of "Caucasian Knot."

The concluded agreement removes the threat of early termination of powers before the elections

In his opinion, the decision on Salpagarov is indeed unique for the Prosecutor General's Office, which usually demands complete confiscation.

"The terms of the deal are not disclosed, but they almost always imply large payments to the budget and a voluntary refusal of part of the disputed assets. The senator's term until 2029 is not accidental here: with an unpaid claim, it is more challenging to retain a mandate, while the concluded agreement removes the threat of early termination of powers before the elections," Fatulaev pointed out.

According to Dmitry Abrosimov, this will soon become a widespread practice.

"Pre-trial settlements will go en masse. Because panic has set in, and civil servants will agree to resolve all issues pre-trial, and then the responsibility will be as minimal as possible, at zero. It is better to give up property than to face something worse. For example, a criminal case under Article 160 of the Criminal Code (embezzlement or misappropriation)," Abrosimov explained.

Analysts debated the impact of the criminal prosecution of Umakhanov's brother on the preservation of his deputy mandate

The scandal surrounding State Duma deputy Saigidpasha Umakhanov is linked to the criminal prosecution of his elder brother, Akhmedpasha Umakhanov, who is accused of creating an organized criminal community and a series of murders, noted Sergey Boyko.

Against the backdrop of declining interest from federal authorities in the elections, Saigidpasha Umakhanov has every chance of entering the new convocation of the State Duma

"In the shadow of this criminal case, old accusations of ties with militants, made by the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, have also resurfaced. According to the investigation, the criminal community operated in Dagestan in the early 2000s. The case was initiated in February 2026 and then merged with an unsolved murder and weapons possession case from 2005. By the time of the searches in his house in Khasavyurt, Akhmedpasha Umakhanov had already left Russia, explaining this by the need for treatment abroad. Some media and insiders directly assert that it was deputy Saigidpasha Umakhanov who helped his brother hide abroad, avoiding punishment. Akhmedpasha Umakhanov has been arrested in absentia and placed on the international wanted list through Interpol. The scandal has not yet shaken the positions of Saigidpasha Umakhanov. However, the risks that the case against his brother will turn into problems for him remain. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of declining interest from federal authorities in the elections, Saigidpasha Umakhanov has every chance of entering the new convocation of the State Duma," Boyko said.

The cases of Umakhanov and Salpagarov are not just judicial episodes but links in a significant restructuring of the power configuration ahead of the elections, believes Milrad Fatulaev.

"The arrest in absentia of Saigidpasha Umakhanov's brother is a sign of the diminishing influence of the Umakhanov clan in the so-called 'Northern Zone.' For two decades, this factor played a restraining role: first, in curbing instability from Chechnya, then, in counterbalancing Kadyrov's influence in Dagestan. However, old files in the square in Makhachkala have accumulated for a reason - and over time, they have come into motion. This did not happen suddenly: public criticism of the Umakhanov brothers by the former head of Dagestan Sergey Melikov and resonant deputy inquiries from Saigidpasha on the most pressing issues of the republic have long signaled growing tension. It is noteworthy that Umakhanov actively brought these issues and their answers into the public domain. His presence on the "United Russia" list should be perceived only as inertia - no more. He will not be elected, and this has already become visually clear at the party congress," he said.

The absence of Kadyrov at the head of the "United Russia" list for Chechnya has sparked debates about the reasons for this decision

Milrad Fatulaev believes that Kadyrov did not head the "United Russia" list for Chechnya at the initiative of the Kremlin.

"Chechnya has been without Kadyrov at the head of the list for the first time since 2007 - the head of the republic was not included in the federal part of the 'ER' list. Officially, this is linked to rumors about illness, but for the role of a 'locomotive' (to pull the list without being elected), health is not required. Most likely, it is due to the declining interest in Kadyrov's figure from the Kremlin," Fatulaev believes.

Kadyrov may simply have health problems, suggested Oreshkin*.

"In general, in my opinion, the person is in poor shape, as far as I can judge, and tying him to the electoral campaign is unreasonable," the political scientist believes.

In his opinion, the transfer of power in Chechnya is being prepared in one way or another.

"The question is not whether the transfer of power is being prepared, but how it is being prepared, and in what environments people are competing. The elections to the State Duma are not the first in significance in this competition. The main thing, of course, is the support of local power elites, the support of the Kremlin, financial circles, and so on. It is not at all necessary to win the Duma elections for this, because who is a State Duma deputy? Today he is a deputy, and tomorrow he is not a deputy, he is removed, and that's it. The deputy status will not protect or help, even if someone wins there, and then his clan turns out to be weak in the struggle for the head position. On the contrary, there will be a split if the clan that brought its person into the Duma cannot offer serious resistance to the clan that brought its people to the head of the republic," Oreshkin* explained.

Sergey Boyko does not yet see a weakening of Kadyrov's positions.

"On the contrary, he continues to strengthen the players on his team, in particular promoting Magomed Daudov at the head of the 'United Russia' list. Let us not forget that the elections to the State Duma in 2026 are not currently a priority for federal authorities. The same tired scenario is being played out again. Kadyrov feels this subtly and, on the contrary, does not want to participate in the imitation process that has lost its high status," Boyko emphasized.

Oreshkin* noted that indeed, there are fewer governors at the head of regional lists of "United Russia".

"Governors have been perceived positively by the population in recent years, at least more positively than in the past. But they have a suspicion that 'United Russia' is not such a powerful political player to which they should tie their political career. In previous electoral campaigns, governors played the role of so-called 'locomotives.' That is, a well-known person, who is well-known in the region, who is more or less respected, heads the list and attracts voters, and after the elections, he steps back and resumes his managerial functions, not engaging in any politics in 'United Russia.' This is a legacy of the times of <помощника президента РФ Владислава> Surkov (held the position until 2020 - note from 'Caucasian Knot'). He actually conceived 'United Russia' as a party of leadership or a union of regional and federal bosses," Oreshkin* pointed out.

Governors do not want to be locomotives, that is, they do not want to be responsible for 'United Russia'

In his opinion, in these elections, due to the unsuccessful course of the military operation, the situation for the authorities is much more complicated than in previous ones. "Therefore, there is mutual distrust, unwillingness, and unpreparedness for interaction. Governors are reasonable people, so they understand that their rating in the region now depends more on their activities, their propaganda, their effectiveness, rather than on 'United Russia.' Therefore, there seems to be some distancing of governors from the party, no matter what ideas voters have about the party. Governors do not want to be locomotives, that is, they do not want to be responsible for 'United Russia,'" Oreshkin* said.

David Kankiya* noted that a number of governors, in particular Kondratiev, have always avoided the 'United Russia' list, as the governor of Kuban has not headed its lists.

"One can see in the fact that governors of large regions are not nominated a sign that they have some opportunity to avoid unnecessary burdens. On the other hand, <мэра Москвы Сергея> Sobyanin was placed at the head of the entire 'United Russia' list, but he is a completely different story and a generally popular head," Kankiya* pointed out.

Dmitry Abrosimov added that governors were re-elected last year.

"Both Rostov and Krasnodar. They both scored about 80%. Now it turns out that 'United Russia' will not gain 80% in any way. Therefore, they do not want to get involved in 'United Russia' and be responsible for the ratings. And there is also a very important problem. The population does not associate the solution of their problems with elections. This is a deplorable situation for the country. This is real across the country, not just in our region," he said.

In Dagestan, however, the list of United Russia was headed by the head of the region, Fatulaev emphasized. "The acting head of the republic Fedor Shchukin headed the team with completely new names, which, notably, are even closer to the new leadership of the republic and are a direct reflection of it. The old faces gave way to those who embody the renewed vertical," he concluded.

* included in the register of foreign agents

** the activities of the Meta company (owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) are banned in Russia.