Human rights groups file proposals for Chechnya to Administration

Yesterday, on June 15, representatives of a number of Russian public organizations - Sergei Kovaliov, chairman of the Russian Memorial Society and a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group; Oleg Orlov, chairman of the board of the Memorial Human Rights Center; Svetlana Gannushkina, a member of the board of the Memorial Human Rights Center and chair of the Civic Assistance committee; Tatiana Lokshina of the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Demos center; and S. Davidis of the Antiwar Club - presented ?Theses on proposals for the search of ways of settlement of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic.? These theses were passed by the nongovernmental organizations in the second half of May to the Administration of the Russian president, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that had visited the Chechen Republic.

Below is the text of the document.

1. The death of Akhmat Kadyrov has again posed the problem of searching for ways of settlement of the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic, not only to the Russian leadership but also to the entire Russian society.

2. The question of government in the Chechen Republic is the most important aspect of this problem. The government in Chechnya must be shaped on the basis of the will of the population of the Chechen Republic. It is in the process of expressing this will that the people of the Chechen Republic should have the chance to make a choice of the future for Chechnya.

3. The referendum on the Constitution of the Chechen Republic and the following election of the president of the Chechen Republic went along with such massive violations of the rights of voters and were so non-free that it is impossible to speak seriously about any legitimacy of the Constitution in effect currently and the government shaped on its basis.

4. There is a need to search for possible ways out of the legal and political deadlock that has taken shape in Chechnya. The ongoing armed conflict claims new and new lives, destroys human destinies and has an extremely negative influence on the political and social life throughout Russia.

5. The most desirable and consistent solution would be the long way of a multistage negotiating process between the president of Russia (or his representatives) and the president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (or his representatives) on a cease-fire and development of an algorithm for determining the future status of Chechnya; creation of interim government agencies and a following referendum on the status of Chechnya or an election of some kind of constituent body.

6. However, on account of many reasons this most desirable way can hardly be implemented at present. The steps we propose are therefore inevitably of a half-and-half, compromising nature. If there is minimum good will proceeding from the Kremlin though, they could be put into practice.

7. The need to shape a new government in Chechnya gives the Russian leadership some chances to begin to implement a political settlement in Chechnya which may not be optimal, but still possible. Chechnya should elect a parliament and a president. Unlike the previous elections, these must be honest. Pressure of the executive on voters, bribery and so on must be left out in the course of these elections.

8. The current situation in the Chechen Republic leaves no chances that such elections, if they are conducted within the period indicated in the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, will be freer and fairer than the previous ones.

9. Russia's central government must postpone these elections. There is the only chance for that - declaring a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic. There are all reasons to declare one in the republic in accordance with the law ?On emergency.?

10. The emergency period must be used by the Russian government to prepare actual conditions in the Chechen Republic to conduct honest elections there. This requires taking comprehensive measures:

• announcing a wide amnesty to all members of the armed units that oppose the federal forces in Chechnya. The only condition to deny someone such an amnesty is his having committed grave crimes against civilians, prisoners and forcibly kept people. An attempt on the life of representatives of government agencies must come under the amnesty. The president of Russia guarantees personal safety to those people who lay down arms as part of the amnesty and appoints his special representative to control the amnesty process and ensure the safety of the people who have passed the amnesty;
• preparing conditions for all political forces in Chechnya (including supporters of Chechnya's independence) to be able to carry out peaceful agitation in support of their platforms in the process of the following election campaigns. Separatism as such, unless it is connected with violence and propaganda of ethnic or religious hatred, cannot be considered a crime;
• involving as many observers from various international organizations, including human rights organizations (the OSCE, UN, COE, EU, nongovernmental organizations) in monitoring the situation in the Chechen Republic;
• organizing the beginning of a roundtable dialogue between all political forces in Chechnya;
• reinforcing prosecution agencies in the Chechen Republic, toughening the responsibility of prosecution and policing agencies for investigating crimes, including those committed by law enforcement and security agencies with regard to civilians;
• conducting an audit of the make-up and the activities of various Chechen law enforcement and security agencies and bring their activities strictly in line with Russian legislation;
• implementing a series of socio-economic measures, in particular launching full-scale work on the clearing and reconstruction of Grozny, completing the payment of compensations, providing people with building materials;
• organizing staged return to Chechnya of those its residents who are ready to back. In doing so, pressure of any kind on internally displaced people with the purpose of making them return to the Chechen Republic must be absolutely excluded.

11. The state of emergency will be canceled only when the international observers from the UN, OSCE, COE, EU and other major international and inter-state organizations come to a conclusion that conditions for conducting honest elections in Chechnya have been established there.

12. All political forces intending to take part in the elections sign an agreement on rejection of attempts to settle political issues by force on condition that the federal government meets the obligations it undertakes; they pledge to respect the choice of the people of Chechnya whatever it is. In particular, supporters of independence for the Chechen Republic undertake to seek to achieve their goals peacefully in the event of their victory.

13. New electoral commissions are set up involving representatives of all political forces in Chechnya on a broad scale. New electoral registers are drawn up.

14. The president of Russia undertakes on behalf of the federal government the following:

• not to try to provide assistance to any political force in the process of the election campaign and the election,
• to respect the choice of the people of Chechnya whatever it is,
• to launch dialogue with the supporters of Chechnya?s independence to develop, in the event of their victory, mechanisms for determining the future status of the Chechen Republic.

15. The Chechen Republic elects the leadership: first the parliament and then the president.

16. The federal government and the new political leadership of the Chechen Republic begin talks on signing a treaty on the distribution of authority or mechanisms for determining the future status of Chechnya.